On the distinction between the concept of God and conceptions of God

The starting-point is the distinction between concept and conception. Our conceptions of gold, for instance, are the different understandings we get when we hear the word ‘gold’ whereas the concept of gold consists in the scientific determination of what gold is. It depends on the context whether it is more reasonable to claim a concept or to look for fitting conceptions. By arguing against metaphysical realism and for non-metaphysical realism, I will elaborate on some philosophical reasons for dealing with conceptions instead of concepts of God, and secondly, I will discuss how such conceptions should be critically assessed.
Keywords Concept  Conception  Metaphysical realism  Non-metaphysical realism  Assessment of conceptions of God
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DOI 10.1007/s11153-008-9163-z
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Truth, Language and History.Donald Davidson - 2005 - Oxford University Press.

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