Authors |
|
Abstract |
The capacity to act in accordance with one’s morality (broadly construed) is constitutive of moral agency. This capacity can be undermined—in whole or in part—by for instance, hypnosis, addiction, or obsessive-compulsion. Another way this capacity can be undermined is through poor moral reasoning. Moral irrationality can frustrate one’s capacity to act in accordance with one’s morality and in turn, stunt one’s moral agency. In a similar respect, improving moral rationality can strengthen this capacity and enhance moral agency. The empirical research program on (non-moral) cognitive debiasing inspires developing techniques to improve our moral rational capacities—i.e., moral debiasing. Yet, moral debiasing presupposes moral biases—that is, systematic moral errors. So, what are moral errors exactly? The pertinent kind is subjective moral errors. Ultimately, A’s φ-ing is a subjective moral error insofar as φ-ing deviates from A’s genuine morality per instrumental subjective moral rationality (ISMR)—i.e., insofar as φ-ing frustrates A+’s morally-relevant ends, wherein A+ is a counterfactual idealization of A upon whom is bestowed those endowments that A considers authoritative under ordinary optimal conditions. The provision of an in-principle standard of subjective moral error lays important theoretical groundwork for future empirical inquiry into subjective moral debiasing.
|
Keywords | Subjective Moral Debiasing Idealization Enhancing Agency Reasoning Irrationality Biases Error |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Subjective Moral Biases & Fallacies: Developing Scientifically & Practically Adequate Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics & Biases.Mark H. Herman - 2019 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral Agency: What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to Be a Moral Agent? [REVIEW]Kenneth Einar Himma - 2009 - Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):19-29.
Moral Agency in Other Animals.Paul Shapiro - 2006 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):357-373.
Moral Bioenhancement, Social Biases, and the Regulation of Empathy.Keisha Ray & Lori Gallegos de Castillo - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):125-133.
The Moral Agency Argument Against Moral Bioenhancement.Massimo Reichlin - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):53-62.
Aid and Bias.Keith Horton - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):545 – 561.
Autism, Empathy and Questions of Moral Agency.Timothy Krahn & Andrew Fenton - 2009 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (2):145-166.
Do Normative Standards Advance Our Understanding of Moral Judgment?David A. Pizarro & Eric Luis Uhlmann - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):558-559.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2020-07-15
Total views
68 ( #166,942 of 2,498,558 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #63,083 of 2,498,558 )
2020-07-15
Total views
68 ( #166,942 of 2,498,558 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #63,083 of 2,498,558 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads