Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383 (2018)

Abstract
In this paper, I argue that some intentional actions are not triggered by proximal intentions; i.e. there are actions which are intentional, but lack relevant proximal intentions in their immediate causal history. More specifically, I first introduce various properties of intentions. I then argue that some actions are triggered by mental states which lack properties typically ascribed to intentions, yet these actions are still intentional. The view that all intentional actions are triggered by proximal intentions is thus false.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/13869795.2018.1435822
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 63,133
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Willing, Wanting, Waiting.Richard Holton - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Motivation and Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Snubbing Proximal Intentions.Alfred Mele - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2833-2853.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Proximal Intentions, Intention-Reports, and Vetoing.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
We-Intentions and Social Action.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1985 - Analyse & Kritik 7 (1):26-43.
The Range of Intentions.Donald Gustafson - 1975 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):83 – 95.
What Are Intentions?Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press. pp. 70--84.
The Essential Indexicality of Intentional Action.Matthew Babb - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):439-457.
Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees.Angelica Kaufmann - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):745-760.
“Some Remarks On Intention In Action”.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Studies in Social Justice:1-18.
Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.
Intentions, Goals, and the Archaeological Record.Rex Welshon - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):425-426.
Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
The Intentionality of Intention and Action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-02-21

Total views
15 ( #673,582 of 2,448,218 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #451,050 of 2,448,218 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes