Trigger warning: no proximal intentions required for intentional action

Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):364-383 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that some intentional actions are not triggered by proximal intentions; i.e. there are actions which are intentional, but lack relevant proximal intentions in their immediate causal history. More specifically, I first introduce various properties of intentions. I then argue that some actions are triggered by mental states which lack properties typically ascribed to intentions, yet these actions are still intentional. The view that all intentional actions are triggered by proximal intentions is thus false.

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References found in this work

Willing, Wanting, Waiting.Richard Holton - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.

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