Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1) (forthcoming)

Authors
Shawn Xavier Hernandez
California State University, Long Beach
N. G. Laskowski
California State University, Long Beach
Abstract
When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as GOOD, OUGHT, and REASON. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Matti Eklund is a notable exception. In his recent book, Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively”. One view that Eklund aims to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties. In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way.
Keywords metaethics  normativity  concepts  normative concepts  reference  concept possession  conceptual competence  deliberation
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References found in this work BETA

Choosing Normative Concepts.Matti Eklund - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.
The Importance of Concepts.Sarah Sawyer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):127-147.
Humean Nature.Neil Sinhababu - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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