Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):403-418 (2019)

David B. Hershenov
State University of New York, Buffalo
Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion for the death of a human animal, then it is also the correct criterion for the death of a human person. What the nonidentity of persons and animals requires is only that they have distinct criteria for ceasing to exist.
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DOI 10.1007/s11017-019-09506-8
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References found in this work BETA

We Are Not Human Beings.Derek Parfit - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (1):5-28.
What Are We?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers, 1956-1972.John Perry - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (13):416-428.

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Citations of this work BETA

Brain death: new questions and fresh perspectives.Farr Curlin - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):355-358.

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