Analogy and confirmation theory

Philosophy of Science 31 (4):319-327 (1964)
Abstract
The argument from analogy is examined from the point of view of Carnap's confirmation theory. It is argued that if inductive arguments are to be applicable to the real world, they must contain elementary analogical inferences. Carnap's system as originally developed (theλ -system) is not strong enough to take account of analogical arguments, but it is shown that the new system, which he has announced but not published in detail (theη -system), is capable of satisfying the conditions of inductive analogy. Finally it is shown that an elementary analysis of analogical inference yields postulates of the η -system with a minimum of arbitrary assumptions
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/288017
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,702
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Models and Analogies in Science.Mary B. Hesse - 1963 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Variety, Analogy, and Periodicity in Inductive Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - Philosophy of Science 30 (3):222-227.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
William Bateson and the Chromosome Theory of Heredity: A Reappraisal.Alan Rushton - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Science 47 (1):147-171.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy of Science: Reasoning by Analogy in Theory Construction.Lindley Darden - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:147 - 165.
Goodman's "New Riddle".Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
Inductive Analogy in Carnapian Spirit.Theo A. F. Kuipers - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:157 - 167.
Analogy Counterarguments and the Acceptability of Analogical Hypotheses.Cameron Shelley - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):477-496.
Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory.Peter Achinstein - 1963 - Philosophy of Science 30 (3):207-221.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

258 ( #12,707 of 2,158,673 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #354,589 of 2,158,673 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums