Abstract
The first two volumes of the Minnesota Studies contained some of the classic accounts of this view, especially Carnap's "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts," and Hempel's "The Theoretician's Dilemma," but even in these volumes anticipations of a change of view are discernible, in Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Scriven's "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories," and Pap's excellent "Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic," in which the adequacy of the empiricist's refuge in extensional logic is queried. Volume III contains two papers within the "orthodoxy." One is a careful examination by Hempel of the structure of statistical explanation, which is shown to differ in important respects from the deductive pattern. The other is Rozeboom's "The Factual Content of Theoretical Concepts," which defends a "Thesis of semantic empiricism," namely that "the semantic properties, if any, of theoretical expressions derive,... wholly from their use with the observation language". Rozeboom holds that the factual content of a theory is designated by its Ramsey sentence, although the theory may be enriched in different and perhaps incompatible ways to entail further theoretical sentences, in which case a theoretical term may "designate" two or more different entities. The analysis is ingenious, but gives little comfort to those who want to allow for a "meaning" of theoretical concepts not wholly derived from the observation language.