Re-bunking corporate agency

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

My aim in this article is to rescue the holist position on corporate agency (CA) from indignities heaped upon it by friends and enemies alike. Two general criticisms strike at the core of the position: the charge of ‘material failures’ (that the corporate agent lacks a proper material presence) and the charge of illusion (that the intentionality of the corporate agent consists in the intentionality of the members). Both attack the holist position on metaphysical grounds, logically prior to any claims of agency; if these charges cannot be answered then much of the CA literature collapses.The article begins by outlining the criticisms and a holist account of corporate agents that incorporates and transcends earlier offerings on corporate agency from French, List and Pettit, and others. It then addresses the charge of material failures, demonstrating that the holist corporate agent is a material entity (nothing ‘ghostly,’) and arguing that neither its scattered nature nor its dependency on voluntary participation undermines that status. It closes by addressing the charge of illusion, demonstrating that the common charge of double-counting member intentionality is false. Both charges arise from the same misreading of the holist position, which ignores the metaphysics of the corporate agent.

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2023-05-30

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Kendy Hess
College of the Holy Cross

Citations of this work

Social Change, Solidarity, and Mass Agency.Kevin Richardson - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (2):210-232.

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References found in this work

Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
What is a (social) structural explanation?Sally Haslanger - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):113-130.
Brutal Composition.Ned Markosian - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 92 (3):211 - 249.
The ontology of social groups.Amie L. Thomasson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4829-4845.
Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.

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