Philosophy of Science 37 (1):50-63 (1970)

Abstract
Hempel's qualitative criteria of converse consequence and special consequence for confirmation are examined, and the resulting paradoxes traced to the general intransitivity of confirmation. Adopting a probabilistic measure of confirmation, a limiting form of transitivity of confirmation from evidence to predictions is derived, and it is shown to what extent its application depends on prior probability judgments. In arguments involving this kind of transitivity therefore there is no necessary "convergence of opinion" in the sense claimed by some personalists. The conditions of application of the limiting transitivity theorem are most perspicuously described in terms of De Finetti's notion of exchangeability, which leads to a suggested revaluation of the function of theories in relation to confirmation and explanation
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DOI 10.1086/288279
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References found in this work BETA

Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):311-325.
Analogy and Confirmation Theory.Mary Hesse - 1964 - Philosophy of Science 31 (4):319-327.
Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic.Risto Hilpinen - 1971 - Synthese 22 (3-4):482-487.
The Problem of Theoretical Terms.Peter Achinstein - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (3):235-249.

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Citations of this work BETA

Relevant Deduction.Gerhard Schurz - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):391 - 437.
A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.William A. Roche - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.

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