Elusive epistemological justification

Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330 (2010)
What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
Keywords Meta-epistemology  Scepticism  Justification  David Lewis  Externalism  Knowledge  Reflection  Regress
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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