Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330 (2010)
What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
|Keywords||Meta-epistemology Scepticism Justification David Lewis Externalism Knowledge Reflection Regress|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology.Michael Williams - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.
Similar books and articles
Is This a World Where Knowledge has to Include Justification?Stephen Hetherington - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41–69.
Naturalized Virtue Ethics and the Epistemological Gap.Stephen R. Brown - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (2):197-209.
Fallibilism, Factivity and Epistemically Truth-Guaranteeing Justification.Boris Rähme - 2007 - In Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen (eds.), Discursive Modernity. Universitetsforlaget.
Relativism and Our Warrant for Scientific Theories.Paul Faulkner - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):259 – 269.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads95 ( #52,561 of 2,154,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #60,673 of 2,154,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?