Philosophia 34 (3):303-310 (2006)
It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.
|Keywords||Knowledge Scepticism Skepticism Ordinary epistemic practice Fallibilism Gradualism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Epistemic Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (4):562-570.
Smells Like Pragmatism: Wittgenstein's Anti-Sceptical Weapons.Kristijan Krkac - 2003 - Prolegomena 2 (1):41-60.
Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
Scepticism, Relativism and the Argument From the Criterion.Howard Sankey - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?By Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):232–251.
Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington.Adam Leite - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):311-324.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads47 ( #110,738 of 2,168,616 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,837 of 2,168,616 )
How can I increase my downloads?