Scepticism and ordinary epistemic practice

Philosophia 34 (3):303-310 (2006)
It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.
Keywords Knowledge  Scepticism  Skepticism  Ordinary epistemic practice  Fallibilism  Gradualism
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-006-9018-8
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