Reasons and impossibility

Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246 (2010)
In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to do what she cannot do. I discuss a number of objections to this view, in particular two: (1) The objection that if there were reasons to do what one cannot do, many of those would be ‘crazy reasons’, and (2) the worry that if there were such reasons, then agents would have reasons to engage in futile deliberations and tryings. I develop an explanation of ‘crazy reasons’ that shows that not all reasons to do the impossible are crazy and only those that are need to be filtered out, and, regarding the second objecting, I show that the reasons for trying as well as for taking the means to doing something—instrumental reasons in a broad sense—are different from the reasons for performing the action in the first place. They are affected by impossibility, and we can explain why that is so. The view I argue for is that a person may have a reason to do what she cannot do, but she does not have a reason to try to do so or to take means to realizing the impossible.
Keywords Reasons for action  Impossibility  Instrumental reasons  Trying and intending  Bart Streumer on reasons and impossibility
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Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9285-2
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References found in this work BETA
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.
The Cement of the Universe.J. L. Mackie - 1974 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Reasons as Explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.
Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer.Bart Streumer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):79 - 86.
Reasons for Action and Psychological Capacities.Rosemary Lowry - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):521 - 531.
Reasons and Ideals.Kimberley Brownlee - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):433-444.

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