A brain in a vat cannot break out: why the singularity must be extended, embedded and embodied

Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1-2):126-142 (2012)
Abstract
The present paper criticizes Chalmers's discussion of the Singularity, viewed as the emergence of a superhuman intelligence via the self-amplifying development of artificial intelligence. The situated and embodied view of cognition rejects the notion that intelligence could arise in a closed 'brain-in-a-vat' system, because intelligence is rooted in a high-bandwidth, sensory-motor interaction with the outside world. Instead, it is proposed that superhuman intelligence can emerge only in a distributed fashion, in the form of a self-organizing network of humans, computers, and other technologies: the 'Global Brain'
Keywords Web Science Social Machines Collective Cognition Extended Cognition
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,423
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Pressing the Flesh: A Tension in the Study of the Embodied, Embedded Mind?Andy Clark - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):37–59.
Intentionality and Embodied Cognition.Mark Rowlands - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):81-97.
Simplicity and Why the Universe Exists.Quentin Smith - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (279):125 - 132.
Embodied Social Cognition and Embedded Theory of Mind.Marco Fenici - 2012 - Biolinguistics 6 (3--47):276--307.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-10-27

Total downloads
40 ( #157,802 of 2,284,970 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #387,651 of 2,284,970 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature