Synthese 95 (1):77 - 94 (1993)

Abstract
Nelson Goodman's proposal for a reconception of meaning consists in replacing the absolute notion ofsameness of meaning by that oflikeness of meaning (with respect to pertinent contexts). According to this view, synonymy is a matter of degree (of interreplaceability) with identity of expression as a limiting case. Goodman's demonstration that no two expressions are exactly alike in meaning is shown to be unsuccessful. Although it does not make use of quotational contexts for the test of interreplaceability, it is tantamount to their acceptance. Goodman rejects quotational contexts; I argue that they should be accepted. This move offers two advantages.Firstly, and mainly, it allows interlinguistic comparison of meaning, something that has not been deemed possible in the received version of Goodman's account.Secondly, it restores the full scale of likeness of meaning damaged by the renunciation of those contexts that guarantee difference in meaning for diverse expressions.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF01064668
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,064
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ways of Worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Harvester Press.
The Structure of Appearance.Nelson Goodman - 1951 - Harvard University Press.
Problems and Projects.Nelson Goodman (ed.) - 1972 - Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Of Mind and Other Matters.Nelson Goodman - 1984 - Harvard University Press.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
58 ( #179,476 of 2,439,659 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #432,499 of 2,439,659 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes