Argument and Computation 12 (1):3-47 (2021)

Christian Straßer
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Structured argumentation formalisms, such as ASPIC +, offer a formal model of defeasible reasoning. Usually such formalisms are highly parametrized and modular in order to provide a unifying framework in which different forms of reasoning can be expressed. This generality comes at the price that, in their most general form, formalisms such as ASPIC + do not satisfy important rationality postulates, such as non-interference. Similarly, links to other forms of knowledge representation, such as reasoning with maximal consistent sets of rules, are insufficiently studied for ASPIC + although such links have been established for other, less complex forms of structured argumentation where defeasible rules are absent. Clearly, for a formal model of defeasible reasoning it is important to understand for which range of parameters the formalism displays a behavior that adheres to common standards of consistency, logical closure and logical relevance and can be adequately described in terms of other well-known forms of knowledge representation. In this paper we answer this question positively for a fragment of ASPIC + without the attack form undercut by showing that it satisfies all standard rationality postulates of structured argumentation under stable and preferred semantics and is adequate for reasoning with maximal consistent sets of defeasible rules. The study is general in that we do not impose any other requirements on the strict rules than to be contrapositable and propositional and in that we also consider priorities among defeasible rules, as long as they are ordered by a total preorder and lifted by weakest link. In this way we generalize previous similar results for other structured argumentation frameworks and so shed further light on the close relations between assumption-based argumentation and ASPIC +.
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DOI 10.3233/aac-200903
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Input/Output Logics.David Makinson & Leendert van der Torre - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):383-408.

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