Tim Heysse
KU Leuven
According to Thomas Nagel we have a natural impulse to transcend our personal point of view. However, it appears to be difficult to give this notion of transcendence any real content while maintaining a connection with everyday speech and behaviour. In this essay I show that the description of what happens in a discussion when a speaker convinces a listener suggests an interesting interpretation of transcendence. The notion of 'truth' linked to the listener who is being convinced introduces a normative dimension in argumentation. This inescapable normative stance of the listener saddles her with the obligation to answer all credible objections against all arguments she has accepted. The evaluation of the arguments is not reserved for the participants of a discussion. Nothing more is required. For instance, the notion of a universal consensus has no place in the analysis of argumentation. If there is a universal dimension in argumentation and discussion, it is because there is no way of telling where convincing objections may come from.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/002017498321715
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,740
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Harvard University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 51 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Contrastive Self‐Attribution of Belief.Scott F. Aikin - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103.
Holding One’s Own.Scott F. Aikin - 2008 - Argumentation 22 (4):571-584.
Consensus and Power in Deliberative Democracy.Tim6 Heysse - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):265 – 289.
Power, Norms and Theory. A Meta-Political Inquiry.Tim6 Heysse - 2015 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-23.
Power, Norms and Theory. A Meta-Political Inquiry.Tim Heysse - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (2):163-185.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
28 ( #397,024 of 2,462,864 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,387 of 2,462,864 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes