A note on pretense and co-reference

Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400 (2010)
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Anna Pautz has recently argued that the pretense theory of thought about fiction cannot explain how two people can count as thinking about the same fictional character. This is based on conflating pretending and the serious thought that can be based on pretend. With this distinction in place, her objections are groundless.



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Michael R. Hicks
Miami University, Ohio