Philosophical Studies 149 (3):395 - 400 (2010)
AbstractAnna Pautz has recently argued that the pretense theory of thought about fiction cannot explain how two people can count as thinking about the same fictional character. This is based on conflating pretending and the serious thought that can be based on pretend. With this distinction in place, her objections are groundless.
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Citations of this work
Pretense and fiction-directed thought.Michael R. Hicks - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1549-1573.
Fictional Characters and Their Discontents: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of Fictional Entities.Shamik Chakravarty - 2021 - Dissertation, Lingnan University
References found in this work
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 49 (2):161-166.
Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. WALTON - 1990 - Philosophy 66 (258):527-529.