Authors
Michael Hicks
University of Cologne
Abstract
Humean accounts of laws of nature fail to distinguish between dynamic laws and static initial conditions. But this distinction plays a central role in scientific theorizing and explanation. I motivate the claim that this distinction should matter for the Humean, and show that current views lack the resources to explain it. I then develop a regularity theory that captures this distinction. My view takes empirical accessibility to be one of the primary features of laws, and I identify features laws must have to be empirically accessible. I then argue that laws with these features tend to be dynamic. _1_ The Best System _1.1_ Orthodox Humeanism _2_ The Best Is Not Good Enough _2.1_ Laws and boundary conditions _2.2_ Laws and scientific practice _2.3_ An illustrative example _3_ Laws and Epistemic Roles _3.1_ The epistemic criterion _3.2_ The epistemic role account _3.3_ Scientific virtues _3.4_ Applying the epistemic role account _4_ Conclusion
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axx006
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References found in this work BETA

Nature’s Metaphysics.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David K. Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

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Citations of this work BETA

Humeanism About Laws of Nature.Harjit Bhogal - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (8).
Non‐Humean Theories of Natural Necessity.Tyler Hildebrand - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (5):1-1.
Centering the Principal Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
Making Best Systems Best for Us.Christian Loew & Siegfried Jaag - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2525-2550.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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