Getting the quasi-picture: Twardowskian representationalism and Husserl's argument against it

Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (4):461-480 (2005)
Abstract
: This paper advances an account of Twardowski as a representationalist. In particular, Twardowskian representationalism is a blend of what I call resemblance representationalism and mediator-content representationalism. It was not, I argue here, proxy-percept representationalism. Twardowski treated mental contents as "signs" or "quasi-pictures." Husserl was a well-known critic of this view. I additionally argue that Husserl's criticism is grounded in the claim that Twardowski conflated representational content with sensations. The distinction on which this Husserlian criticism rests is between the psychological and ideal contents of consciousness, the cornerstone of the early Husserlian phenomenology
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2005.0160
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