Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons


Authors
Amelia Hicks
Kansas State University
Abstract
In this paper, I argue that the fetishism objection to moral hedging fails. The objection rests on a reasons-responsiveness account of moral worth, according to which an action has moral worth only if the agent is responsive to moral reasons. However, by adopting a plausible theory of non-ideal moral reasons, one can endorse a reasons-responsiveness account of moral worth while maintaining that moral hedging is sometimes an appropriate response to moral uncertainty. Thus, the theory of moral worth upon which the fetishism objection relies does not, in fact, support that objection.
Keywords moral uncertainty  moral hedging  non-ideal moral theory  moral reasons  moral worth
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The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
Unprincipled Virtue.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):201-204.
Accidentally Doing the Right Thing.ZoË A. Johnson King - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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