Singular mental abilities

European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):639-660 (2021)
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Abstract

Lucy O'Brien has argued that defenders of the object-dependence of singular thought should attend to mental agency. A recent trend in action theory, towards what John Maier calls ‘agentive modality’, suggests that we conceive agency in terms of the exercise of abilities, and this is how I propose to approach O'Brien's challenge. For Gareth Evans, an early defender of object-dependence, maintained that thinking is the exercise of a complex of abilities. The debate about object-dependence gives way to the question whether we have what I call dedicated singular mental abilities. In arguing that we do, I defend the thesis of object-dependence.

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Michael R. Hicks
Miami University, Ohio

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