Philosophical Studies 176 (1):65-92 (2019)

Authors
Eric Hiddleston
Wayne State University
Abstract
This paper has two main aims. The first is to present a general approach for understanding “dispositional” and “categorical” properties; the second aim is to use this approach to criticize Russellian Monism. On the approach I suggest, what are usually thought of as “dispositional” and “categorical” properties are really just the extreme ends of a spectrum of options. The approach allows for a number of options between these extremes, and it is plausible, I suggest, that just about everything of scientific interest falls in this middle ground. I argue that Russellian Monism depends for its plausibility on the unarticulated assumption that there are no properties in the middle ground.
Keywords Dispositional properties  Russellian monism  Powers  Philosophy of mind
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-1006-2
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Possibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers.Lok-Chi Chan & Andrew J. Latham - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Humility Regarding Intrinsic Properties.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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