Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415 (2011)

Authors
Eric Hiddleston
Wayne State University
Abstract
This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties
Keywords Reduction  Functionalism  Mental property  Second-order property  Functional property  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9518-z
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New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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