Controlling attitudes

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74 (2006)
Abstract
I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.
Keywords Attitude  Believing  Epistemology  Free Will  Truth  Voluntary  Will  Bennett, Jonathan  Williams, Bernard  Reasons
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00247.x
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Citations of this work BETA
Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.
Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.
No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.

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