Controlling attitudes

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 1981 - In Felicia Ackerman (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 36–52.
In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.
Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.
Intention as Belief.John Schwenkler - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):318-334.
Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
The Trinity and the Light Switch: Two Faces of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Doxastic Agency.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
Believing intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
2,175 (#5,268)

6 months
249 (#9,458)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Pamela Hieronymi
University of California, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.
What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.

View all 218 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.
Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.
Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.

Add more references