Metaphilosophy 51 (4):522-547 (2020)

Authors
Ilmari Hirvonen
University of Helsinki
Abstract
This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail.
Keywords epistemic evaluability  epistemic opportunism  scientific imperialism  scientism  self‐referential incoherence  transcendental argumentation
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/meta.12443
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 57,109
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ontological Relativity.W. V. Quine - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (7):185-212.
Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - In James Ladyman, Don Ross, David Spurrett & John Collier (eds.), Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press.
Human Nature and the Limits of Science.John Dupré - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
The Counter-Revolution of Science.F. Hayek - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (15):246-248.
Beyond Fredom and Dignity.B. F. Skinner - 1973 - Science and Society 37 (2):227-229.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Towards a moderate scientism.Sander Verhaegh & Pieter van der Kolk - 2015 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 107 (3):285-299.
What is Scientism?Mikael Stenmark - 1997 - Religious Studies 33 (1):15-32.
Is Scientism Epistemically Vicious?Ian James Kidd - 2017 - In Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), Scientism: Prospects and Problems. Oxford University Press. pp. 222-249.
Bioethics and Epistemic Scientism.Christopher Mayes, Claire Hooker & Ian Kerridge - 2015 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 12 (4):565-567.
More in Defense of Weak Scientism.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (4):7-25.
Six Signs of Scientism.Susan Haack - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):75-95.
In Defense of Weak Scientism: A Reply to Brown.Moti Mizrahi - 2017 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (2):9-22.
Defending Science - Within Reason.Susan Haack - 1999 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (2):187-212.
Conceptions of Philosophy and the Challenges of Scientism.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Scientism: For and Against. New York:
Weak Scientism Defended Once More: A Reply to Wills.Moti Mizrahi - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (6):41-50.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-22

Total views
10 ( #843,204 of 2,411,639 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #149,503 of 2,411,639 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes