Responsibility for believing

Synthese 161 (3):357-373 (2008)
Authors
Pamela Hieronymi
University of California, Los Angeles
Abstract
Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible.
Keywords Doxastic voluntarism  Epistemic responsibility  Voluntary
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9089-x
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.
Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy.
Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.

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Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.
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Taking Control of Belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.
Doing & Deserving; Essays in the Theory of Responsibility.Joel Feinberg - 1970 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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