Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):803-824 (2020)

The theory of we-mode cognition seeks to expand our understanding of the cognition involved in joint action, and therein claims to explain how we can have non-theoretical and non-simulative access to the minds of others. A basic tenet of this theory is that each individual jointly intends to accomplish some outcome together, requiring the adoption of a “first-person plural perspective” that is neither strictly individualistic – in the sense that a we-mode state is enabled by the joint involvement of other – nor strictly pluralistic – in the sense that the involved individuals, rather than a ‘group’, are the bearers of the relevant joint intention. Whilst I concur with the idea that, in certain circumstances, we cognise from an irreducible ‘first-person plural perspective’, Gallotti & Frith’s existing proposal of we-mode cognition is in need of theoretical clarification. In this paper, I deliver such clarification so that the theory of we-mode cognition is re-defined as:. sensitive to the phenomenological transformation that is induced by the embodied co-presence of others, and. limited to cases in which one intentionally attends to the capacities of one’s co-participant in joint action.
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-020-00509-2
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Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive Approach to Social Cognition.Hanne De Jaegher & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):485-507.

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