Can Carey answer Quine?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):132-133 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Quinean-analyticity of mathematical propositions.Gregory Lavers - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
Publicness and indeterminacy.Peter Pagin - 2000 - In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand. pp. 163--180.
Naturalized epistemology and epistemic evaluation.Christopher Hookway - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):465 – 485.
What is Quine's view of truth?Donald Davidson - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):437 – 440.
El Babero Quine con la Navaja de Occam Afeitó la Barba de Platón.Eduardo Bermudez Barrera - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:273-281.
Quine and Davidson: Two naturalized epistemologists.Roger F. Gibson - 1994 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):449 – 463.
Quine's 'limits of decision'.William C. Purdy - 1999 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 64 (4):1439-1466.
The two faces of Quine's naturalism.Susan Haack - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):335 - 356.
Is Quine a Verificationist?Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):399-409.
Quine and pragmatism.Heikki J. Koskinen & Sami Pihlström - 2006 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (3):309-346.
Concepts are not icons.Christopher Gauker - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):127.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-10-27

Downloads
34 (#445,975)

6 months
5 (#544,079)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Hill
Brown University

Citations of this work

Newton as Philosopher.Lisa Downing - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):124-129.
Quine.Christopher S. Hill - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):117-124.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
The origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
A Companion to the Philosophy of Language.Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.) - 1997 - Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Add more references