Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):117-145 (2004)

Authors
Alex Voorhoeve
London School of Economics
Abstract
All conceptions of equal opportunity draw on some distinction between morally justified and unjustified inequalities. We discuss how this distinction varies across a range of philosophical positions. We find that these positions often advance equality of opportunity in tandem with distributive principles based on merit, desert, consequentialist criteria or individuals' responsibility for outcomes. The result of this amalgam of principles is a festering controversy that unnecessarily diminishes the widespread acceptability of opportunity concerns. We therefore propose to restore the conceptual separation of opportunity principles concerning unjustified inequalities from distributive principles concerning justifiable inequalities. On this view, equal opportunity implies that that morally irrelevant factors should engender no differences in individuals' attainment, while remaining silent on inequalities due to morally relevant factors. We examine this idea by introducing the principle of ‘opportunity dominance' and explore in a simple application to what extent this principle may help us arbitrate between opposing distributive principles. We also compare this principle to the selection rules developed by John Roemer and Dirk Van de Gaer.
Keywords Equality of opportunity  Social choice
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267104001282
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References found in this work BETA

Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.Richard J. Arneson - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):77 - 93.
Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality.R. M. Dworkin - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):377-389.
On Economic Inequality.Amartya Sen - 1997 - Clarendon Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice.Serena Olsaretti - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.
How Generous Should Egalitarians Be?Zofia Stemplowska - 2019 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (3):269-283.
Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility.Alex Voorhoeve - 2008 - Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):184-200.
Equality of Opportunity for Education: One-Off or Lifelong?Alexander Brown - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (1):63–84.

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