Hawthorne's lottery puzzle and the nature of belief

Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122 (2007)
Authors
Joshua Schechter
Brown University
Abstract
In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that practical reasoning has more to do with rational degrees of belief than with states of knowledge.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00125.x
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
Knowledge and Suberogatory Assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-11.
Prompting Challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.
Excuse Validation: A Study in Rule-Breaking.John Turri & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):615-634.

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