Topoi 7 (March):11-24 (1988)
My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs
|Keywords||Awareness Introspection Metaphysics Philosophical Psychology Sensation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.
What is Wrong with the Appendage Theory of Consciousness?Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.
Similar books and articles
Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.
Introspection and Subliminal Perception.Thomas Zoega Ramsøy & Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.
Concerning Introspective "Knowledge".Thomas Natsoulas - 1970 - Psychological Bulletin 73 (2):89-111.
Awareness of Sensations and of the Location of Sensations.Joseph Margolis - 1966 - Analysis 26 (October):29-32.
In 'Windowless Chambers'.Abigail L. Rosenthal - 1998 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):3-20.
On Neutralizing Introspection: The Data of Sensuous Awareness.J. S. Kelly - 1989 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):29-53.
Introspection in Psychology and Philosophy.Jeffery Geller - 1987 - Philosophy Research Archives 13:471-480.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads124 ( #39,226 of 2,171,776 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #326,702 of 2,171,776 )
How can I increase my downloads?