Norms, Normative Utterances, and Normative Propositions

Análisis Filosófico 26 (2):229-241 (2006)

Abstract
It is argued that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive interpretation of norm sentences can be regarded as a distinction between two kinds of utterances. A norm or a directive has as its content a normative proposition. A normative utterance of a normative proposition in appropriate circumstances makes the proposition true, and an assertive utterance has as its truth-maker the norm system to which it refers. This account of norms, norm-contents, and utterances of norm sentences solves Jørgensen's problem: logical relations among norms can be defined in the usual way in terms of the truth-conditions of the normative propositions which form their content. There is no distinction between the logic of norms and the logic of normative propositions; in this respect the present account differs from Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin's account of the logic of normative propositions. Se argumenta que la distinción entre la interpretación normativa y la descriptiva de las oraciones normativas puede ser considerada como una distinción entre dos tipos de emisiones. Una norma o directiva tiene como su contenido una proposición normativa. Una emisión normativa de una proposición normativa en circunstancias apropiadas hace verdadera la proposición y es el sistema de normas al que se refiere una emisión asertiva el que la hace verdadera. Esta concepción de normas, contenidos de normas y emisiones de oraciones normativas resuelve el problema de Jörgensen: las relaciones lógicas entre normas pueden ser definidas de manera usual en términos de las condiciones de verdad de las proposiciones normativas que forman su contenido. No hay diferencia alguna entre la lógica de normas y la lógica de proposiciones normativas; en este aspecto la presente concepción difiere de la concepción de la lógica de proposiciones normativas de Carlos Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,355
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.
Pure Theory of Law.Hans Kelsen - 1967 - Lawbook Exchange.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Belief Norms & Blindspots.Thomas Raleigh - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.
Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority.Linda Radzik - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):633-649.
The Value of Vagueness.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 2011 - In Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law. Oxford University Press, Usa.
Norms of Higher Order.G. H. von Wright - 1983 - Studia Logica 42 (2-3):119 - 127.
Is Logic a Theoretical or Practical Discipline? Kant and/or Bolzano.Anita Kasabova - 2002 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (3):319-333.
The Creation of Normative Facts.Carsten Heidemann - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):263-281.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-10-03

Total views
21 ( #441,754 of 2,286,101 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #835,155 of 2,286,101 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature