Preference Aggregation After Harsanyi

In Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles & John A. Weymark (eds.), Justice, political liberalism, and utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-219 (1998)
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Abstract

Consider a group of people whose preferences satisfy the axioms of one of the current versions of utility theory, such as von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954), or Bolker-Jeffrey (1965). There are political and economic contexts in which it is of interest to find ways of aggregating these individual preferences into a group preference ranking. The question then arises of whether methods of aggregation exist in which the group’s preferences also satisfy the axioms of the chosen utility theory, and in which at the same time the aggregation process satisfies certain plausible conditions (e.g., the Pareto conditions below).

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Mathias Risse
Harvard University

References found in this work

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.

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