Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism

New York: Cambridge University Press (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories, and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Taking type-b materialism seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.
Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity.Don Merrell - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
Unconscious sensations.Lynn Stephens - 1988 - Topoi 7 (1):5-10.
In defense of type materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):295-320.
Christian materialism in a scientific age.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):47-59.
The mind-brain identity theory: a collection of papers.Clive Vernon Borst - 1970 - New York,: St Martin's P.. Edited by D. M. Armstrong.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
187 (#102,040)

6 months
12 (#198,566)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christopher Hill
Brown University

Citations of this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 203 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references