Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313 (2007)

Authors
Avram Hiller
Portland State University
Ram Neta
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
Keywords Knowledge  Epistemic luck  Safety  Duncan Pritchard  Gettier
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 57,138
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Revisionary Intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.
Saving safety from counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5161-5185.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
251 ( #34,205 of 2,411,651 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #101,464 of 2,411,651 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes