Synthese 158 (3):303 - 313 (2007)
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Abstract |
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
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Keywords | Knowledge Epistemic luck Safety Duncan Pritchard Gettier |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0 |
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
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