Value, reason and hedonism

Utilitas 20 (1):50-58 (2008)
Abstract
It is widely believed that we always have reason to maximize the good. Utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories depend on this conception of value. Scanlon has argued that this view of value is not generally correct, but that it is most plausible with regard to the value of pleasure, and may even be true at least of that. But there are reasons to think that even the value of pleasure is not teleological
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0953820807002890
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,781
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Happiness and Pleasure.Daniel M. Haybron - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):501-528.
Practical Reason, Value and Action.Alison Hills - 2007 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):375-392.
Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):539-563.
Intuitive Hedonism.Joseph Mendola - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (2):441 - 477.
The Hedonist's Dilemma.Dale Dorsey - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
82 ( #66,306 of 2,198,883 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #149,212 of 2,198,883 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature