What Are the Odds that Everyone is Depraved?

American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):299-308 (2020)
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Why does God allow evil? One hypothesis is that God desires the existence and activity of free creatures but He was unable to create a world with such creatures and such activity without also allowing evil. If Molinism is true, what probability should be assigned to this hypothesis? Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because there are an infinite number of possible people and because we have no reason to suppose that such creatures will choose one way rather than another. Arguments like this depend on the principle of indifference. But that principle is rejected by most philosophers of probability. Some philosophers claim that a low probability should be assigned because doing otherwise violates intuitions about freewill. But such arguments can be addressed through strategies commonly employed to defend theories with counterintuitive results across ethics and metaphysics.

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Scott Hill
University of Innsbruck

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Animals Deserve Moral Consideration.Scott Hill - 2020 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 33 (2):177-185.

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References found in this work

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Material beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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