Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria for moral agency: What properties must an artificial agent have to be a moral agent? [Book Review]

Ethics and Information Technology 11 (1):19-29 (2009)

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Abstract
In this essay, I describe and explain the standard accounts of agency, natural agency, artificial agency, and moral agency, as well as articulate what are widely taken to be the criteria for moral agency, supporting the contention that this is the standard account with citations from such widely used and respected professional resources as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I then flesh out the implications of some of these well-settled theories with respect to the prerequisites that an ICT must satisfy in order to count as a moral agent accountable for its behavior. I argue that each of the various elements of the necessary conditions for moral agency presupposes consciousness, i.e., the capacity for inner subjective experience like that of pain or, as Nagel puts it, the possession of an internal something-of-which-it is-is-to-be-like. I ultimately conclude that the issue of whether artificial moral agency is possible depends on the issue of whether it is possible for ICTs to be conscious.
Keywords accountability   agency   artificial agents   consciousness   ethics   moral agency   natural agents
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DOI 10.1007/s10676-008-9167-5
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References found in this work BETA

Artificial Evil and the Foundation of Computer Ethics.Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders - 2001 - Ethics and Information Technology 3 (1):55-66.
Reason, Relativity, and Responsibility in Computer Ethics.James H. Moor - 1998 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 28 (1):14-21.

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