Acceptance-dependence: A social kind of response-dependence

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498 (2006)
Abstract
Neither Johnston's nor Wright's account of response-dependence offers a complete picture of response-dependence, as they do not apply to all concepts that are intrinsically related to our mental responses. In order to (begin to) remedy this situation, a new conception of response-dependence is introduced that I call "acceptance-dependence". This account applies to concepts such as goal, constitutional, and money, the first two of which have mistakenly been taken to be response-dependent in another sense. Whereas on Johnston's and Wright's accounts response-dependent concepts depend on counterfactual responses of individuals, acceptance-dependent concepts depend on the actual responses of groups of people. This implies that concepts of the latter kind are less objective than concepts of the former kind.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2006.00272.x
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
The Common Mind.Philip Pettit - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism.Mark Johnston - 1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press. pp. 85--130.

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