Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):161-177 (2009)

Frank Hindriks
University of Groningen
Paradoxical results concerning judgment aggregation have recently been invoked to defend the thesis that a corporate agent can be morally responsible for a decision without any of its individual members bearing such responsibility. I contend that the arguments offered for this irreducibility thesis are inconclusive. They do not pay enough attention to how we evaluate individual moral responsibility, in particular not to the role that a flawed assessment of the normative reasons that bear on the issue to be decided on play in this context. I go on to propose a method for distributing corporate responsibility to individual members within the judgment aggregation framework.
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DOI 10.1017/s0266267109990034
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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