Experiences: An Inquiry Into Some Ambiguities

Oxford: Clarendon Press (1973)
Abstract
Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: 'How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what extent do they justify them?' He wants to refer, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which he cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. He mainly has in mind sense-experiences, and he thinks of them in a particular way. His way of thinking of them, roughly speaking as something 'inner', is one on which recent logico-linguistic philosophy has thrown a good deal of light. The relevant special notion of an experience contrasts, among other things, with a certain more general biographical notion of an experience, which some dictionaries indicate by the definition, 'an event of which one is the subject'. This book explores the concept of experiences, focusing on the disjunctions between perception and illusion.
Keywords Conscious  Consciousness  Epistemology  Event  Experience  Illusion  Perception  Subject
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Call number B105.E9.H56
ISBN(s) 0198244037     9780198244035
DOI 10.2307/2217725
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The Kantian (Non)‐Conceptualism Debate.Colin McLear - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
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Good News for the Disjunctivist About the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
At One with Our Actions, but at Two with Our Bodies.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.

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