If logic meets paraconsistent logic

Abstract

particular alternative logic could be relevant to another one? The most important part of a response to this question is to remind the reader of the fact that independence friendly (IF) logic is not an alternative or “nonclassical” logic. (See here especially Hintikka, “There is only one logic”, forthcoming.) It is not calculated to capture some particular kind of reasoning that cannot be handled in the “classical” logic that should rather be called the received or conventional logic. No particular epithet should be applied to it. IF logic is not an alternative to our generally used basic logic, the received first-order logic, aka quantification theory or predicate calculus. It replaces this basic logic in that it is identical with this “classical” first-order logic except that certain important flaws of the received first-order logic have been corrected. But what are those flaws and how can they be corrected? To answer these questions is to explain the basic ideas of IF logic. Since this logic is not as well known as it should be, such explanation is needed in any case. I will provide three different but not unrelated motivations for IF logic.

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Citations of this work

Meeting Hintikka's Challenge to Paraconsistentism.Walter Carnielli - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (3):283-297.

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