European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):111-140 (2015)

Authors
Edward Hinchman
Florida State University
Abstract
This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self-understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self-intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience
Keywords Intention  Narrative  Diachronic agency
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/ejop.12100
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,064
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Trust and Will.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Diachronic Agency and Practical Entitlement.Matthew Heeney - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):177-198.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Rule Worship and the Stability of Intention.Joe Mintoff - 2004 - Philosophia 31 (3-4):401-426.
The Intentional and the Intended.J. L. A. Garcia - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):191 - 209.
On a Problem for Contractarianism.Joe Mintoff - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):98 – 116.
Getting Inside the Acting Person.Steven J. Jensen - 2010 - International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):461-471.
Hegel's Social Theory of Agency : The 'Inner-Outer' Problem.Robert Pippin - 2010 - In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 3-50.
Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press. pp. 56-82.
Von Wright on Historical Causation1.Elazar Weinryb - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):327-338.
Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-07-12

Total views
231 ( #41,328 of 2,439,610 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #136,690 of 2,439,610 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes