Noûs 43 (3):395-427 (2009)

Authors
Edward Hinchman
Florida State University
Abstract
This paper defends an internalist view of agency. The challenge for an internalist view of agency is to explain how an agent’s all-things-considered judgment has necessary implications for action, a challenge that lies specifically in the possibility of two species of akratic break: between judgment and intention, and between intention and action. I argue that the two breaks are not importantly different: in each case akrasia manifests a single species of irrational self-mistrust. I aim to vindicate internalism by showing how rational agency rests on our capacity for trusting receptivity to the verdict of judgment. To call the relation receptivity is to characterize it as fundamentally passive. To call it trusting receptivity is to ensure that the passivity is not incompatible with agency, since trust retains a crucial degree of control. I argue that the best way to meet the externalist argument from akrasia is to abandon the assumption that the will must be a locus of activity.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00712.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 60,920
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Trust and Will.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
On Not Getting Out of Bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Compromisos sociales y obligaciones racionales.Miranda del Corral de Filipe - 2015 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 66:27-40.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Three Conceptions of Rational Agency.R. Jay Wallace - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):217-242.
Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.
Situating Receptivity: From Critique to 'Reflective Disclosure'.Morton Schoolman - 2011 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 37 (9):1033-1041.
Emotions and the Intelligibility of Akratic Action.Christine Tappolet - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 97--120.
Receptivity and Judgment.Jennifer Nedelsky - 2011 - Ethics and Global Politics 4 (4):231-254.
Building Receptivity: Leopold's Land Ethic and Critical Feminist Interpretation.Kathryn J. Norlock - 2011 - Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture 5 (4):493-512.
The Intellect, Receptivity, and Material Singulars in Aquinas.Siobhan Nash-Marshall - 2002 - International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3):371-388.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
79 ( #132,316 of 2,439,308 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #434,168 of 2,439,308 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes