The status of the knowledge account of assertion

Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406 (2007)
Abstract
According to the increasingly popular knowledge account, assertion is governed by the rule that speech acts of that kind require knowledge of their content. Timothy Williamson has argued that this knowledge rule is the constitutive rule of assertion. It is argued here that it is not the constitutive rule of assertion in any sense of the term, as it governs only some assertions rather than all of them. A (qualified) knowledge rule can in fact be derived from the traditional analysis of assertion according to which assertion is the linguistic expression of belief. Because it is more informative, this analysis provides a better point of departure for defending the knowledge account than Williamson’s view according to which the knowledge rule is part of the analysis of assertion.
Keywords Assertion  Knowledge account of assertion  Belief-expression analysis  Williamson
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DOI 10.1007/s10988-007-9019-5
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
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Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

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Citations of this work BETA
Assertion, Knowledge, and Action.Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99-118.
Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1).
Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion.Peter Milne - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):331-349.
In Defense of Assertion.Brian Montgomery - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):313-326.

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