Aggregation and numbers

Utilitas 16 (1):62-79 (2004)
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Abstract

This article considers the reach of arguments for saving the greater number without interpersonal aggregation, and argues that interpersonal aggregation is useful to encompass the proper respect due to each separate person. I first give a precise definition of interpersonal aggregation, which many non-utilitarians try to avoid. Then, I show that consequentialism and Scanlon can justify the case for the greater number without interpersonal aggregation. However, I propose the Aggregation Approach, which justifies the case for the greater number in some cases and the case for tossing a fair coin in other cases. I conclude that interpersonal aggregation does not disrespect the separate person.

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Iwao Hirose
McGill University

Citations of this work

The Many, the Few, and the Nature of Value.Daniel Muñoz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):70-87.
A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases.Ben Saunders - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):279-290.
Contractualism.Elizabeth Ashford - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Taurek's no worse claim.Weyma Lübbe - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (1):69–85.

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