Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons

Utilitas 25 (2):182-205 (2013)
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Abstract

Many critics of utilitarianism claim that we should reject interpersonal aggregation because aggregative principles do not take the separateness of persons seriously. In this article, I will reject this claim. I will first elucidate the theoretical structure of aggregation. I will then consider various interpretations of the notion of the separateness of persons and clarify what exactly those critics are trying to reject by appealing to the notion of the separateness of persons. I will argue that none of these interpretations can serve as the ground for rejecting aggregation

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Iwao Hirose
McGill University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..

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