In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 229--251 (2009)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned. Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences to be probabilities. I contend that each argument is invalid as formulated. In each case there is a mirror-image theorem and a corresponding argument of exactly equal strength that concludes that rationality requires your credences not to be probabilities. Some further consideration is needed to break this symmetry in favour of probabilism.
|
Keywords | probabilism accuracy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Buy the book |
Find it on Amazon.com
|
DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axn045 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 263-293.
View all 46 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.
Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.
View all 39 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.
Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Compatible?Nicholas Maxwell - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (4):640-645.
Advice-Giving and Scoring-Rule-Based Arguments for Probabilism.Branden Fitelson & Lara Buchak - unknown
Are Probabilism and Special Relativity Incompatible?Nicholas Maxwell - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (1):23-43.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2009-01-28
Total views
81 ( #121,929 of 2,403,693 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #62,114 of 2,403,693 )
2009-01-28
Total views
81 ( #121,929 of 2,403,693 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #62,114 of 2,403,693 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads