In DancyJ (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell (2010)

Authors
Stephan Hartmann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Alan Hajek
Australian National University
Abstract
Bayesianism is our leading theory of uncertainty. Epistemology is defined as the theory of knowledge. So “Bayesian Epistemology” may sound like an oxymoron. Bayesianism, after all, studies the properties and dynamics of degrees of belief, understood to be probabilities. Traditional epistemology, on the other hand, places the singularly non-probabilistic notion of knowledge at centre stage, and to the extent that it traffics in belief, that notion does not come in degrees. So how can there be a Bayesian epistemology?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The No Alternatives Argument.Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):213-234.
Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National University
Hawking Radiation and Analogue Experiments: A Bayesian Analysis.Radin Dardashti, Stephan Hartmann, Karim Thébault & Eric Winsberg - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 67:1-11.
A Novel Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence.Jan Sprenger - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):383-401.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
367 ( #28,898 of 2,533,648 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #18,248 of 2,533,648 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes