Speech Acts, Categoricity, and the Meanings of Logical Connectives

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (4):445-467 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In bilateral systems for classical logic, assertion and denial occur as primitive signs on formulas. Such systems lend themselves to an inferentialist story about how truth-conditional content of connectives can be determined by inference rules. In particular, for classical logic there is a bilateral proof system which has a property that Carnap in 1943 called categoricity. We show that categorical systems can be given for any finite many-valued logic using $n$-sided sequent calculus. These systems are understood as a further development of bilateralism—call it multilateralism. The overarching idea is that multilateral proof systems can incorporate the logic of a variety of denial speech acts. So against Frege we say that denial is not the negation of assertion and, with Mark Twain, that denial is more than a river in Egypt.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Methodological Considerations on the Logical Dynamics of Speech Acts.Tomoyuki Yamada - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:277-282.
Connectives stranger than tonk.Heinrich Wansing - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):653 - 660.
Bilateralism in Proof-Theoretic Semantics.Nissim Francez - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3):1-21.
Superlative quantifiers and meta-speech acts.Ariel Cohen & Manfred Krifka - 2014 - Linguistics and Philosophy 37 (1):41-90.
The Theory of Form Logic.Wolfgang Freitag & Alexandra Zinke - 2012 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4):363-389.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-03-04

Downloads
64 (#242,723)

6 months
9 (#242,802)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ole Thomassen Hjortland
University of Bergen

Citations of this work

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):250-282.
Supposition: A Problem for Bilateralism.Nils Kürbis - 2023 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 53 (3):301-327.
Logical Multilateralism.Heinrich Wansing & Sara Ayhan - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (6):1603-1636.
The Laws of Thought and the Laws of Truth as Two Sides of One Coin.Ulf Hlobil - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (1):313-343.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.
The runabout inference ticket.Arthur Prior - 1967 - In P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical logic. London,: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-9.
Yes and no.I. Rumfitt - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):781-823.
Ideas and Results in Proof Theory.Dag Prawitz & J. E. Fenstad - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (2):232-234.

View all 31 references / Add more references